Between the Pagoda and the Politburo: Exploring the intersection between imperialism and socialism in the early People’s Republic of China through its Tibetan periphery, 1951-9

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List of Abbreviations

CCP  Chinese Communist Party
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
EDIC Economic Defense Intelligence Committee
FO  Foreign Office
NWB  Northwest Bureau
PCTAR Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region
PLA  People’s Liberation Army
PRC  People’s Republic of China
SCMP Survey of China Mainland Press
SMR  South Manchuria Railway
SWB  Southwest Bureau
TWC  Tibet Work Committee
UFWD  United Front Work Department
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Note on Translation

Most proper nouns in this dissertation’s sources were originally rendered from Chinese into Wade-Giles. Barring direct quotations, they have now been rendered into pinyin. Tibetan-language proper nouns (unless Sinicised in the original sources) have been left as found in primary/secondary material.
Introduction

On 27 May 1951 Xinhua (NCNA) printed in full the Agreement between Peking Government and Local Tibetan Government on the “Peaceful Liberation” of Tibet, often abbreviated to The Seventeen Point Agreement. This document claimed to herald transformed relations between the majority-Han People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Tibetans formerly under Lhasa’s sway. Article 1 set the tone, proclaiming, ‘The Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; that the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland- the People's Republic of China.’ Further on, Articles 9 and 10 indicated the PRC’s aim to extend a moderated form of socialist construction and promote educational, agricultural and commercial development in the region, ‘step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.’ Liberation aimed at betterment. A people the mandarins of the British Foreign Office (FO) described as, ‘a primitive, isolated, and extremely provincial society,’ were to enjoy a glittering future built using the tools of Marxist-Leninist party-state institutions and the modernisation project upon which the early PRC centred much of its domestic political legitimacy.

From 1951-9 the PRC materialised a developmental state in Tibet with astonishing rapidity, particularly considering the special treatment promised to The Land of Snows. Concern for, ‘actual conditions,’ imposed a gentler socialism than in interior China. Mass campaigns were eschewed; consciousness was raised via the implanting of educational institutions and the steady training of new cadres, many of them noble, while democratic reforms peaceful or otherwise were never part of central government Tibet policy. As Mao Zedong put it, ‘let them [the Tibetan elite] go on with their insensate atrocities against the people, while we on our part concentrate on good deeds of production, trade, road-building, medical services and united front work.’

Mao’s claims nonetheless stand at disjuncture with events. The 17 Point Agreement was after all signed (and ratified by Lhasa on 24 October) under the threat of People’s Liberation Army

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1Tibet 1950-67 (Hong Kong, 1968), no. 6, pp. 19-21.
2Lamas Return to Tibet’, TNA, FT1015/12 in ‘1955 Internal Political Situation in Tibet’, FCO 371/115372, unpaginated.
3Tibet 1950-67, no. 6, p. 21.
(PLA) conquest. Alongside, ‘good deeds,’ the PRC exhibited a consistent imperative to secure its borderlands, while its interlocutors on the ground often acted on and reinforced discourse on the backwardness of non-Han peoples while building their New China. These actions, beneficial development and elite conciliation alongside securitisation and essentialism, require reconciliation. Observing the PRC’s own claims and its Tibetan socialism itself as it came to be colonised by imperial behaviours suggests that an intersectionality between socialism and imperialism existed from 1951-9.

‘Imperial’ and ‘imperialism’ require definition. Many historians accept a variant of the explanation offered by Michael Doyle; imperialism consists of constructing and maintaining empires, ‘relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies.’ Doyle identifies empire via a variety of clusters, such as, ‘domain,’ where, ‘The domain of empire is a people subject to unequal rule.’ The PRC would appear to be outside that category, the 1954 constitution stating, ‘The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state. All the nationalities are equal.’ Unequal rule in legal terms was anathema to a class-nation-state and its class-citizens. Nonetheless, especially since 1991, imperialism has been reconsidered, new imperial history re-evaluating the 20th century as an epoch of experimentation alongside decay. Suggestions by many of its inhabitants that to quote Boris Yeltsin the Soviet, ‘Marxist experiment,’ was also an imperial one have gained wide academic ground, while the use of terms such as ‘new imperialism’ has expanded. To Prasenjit Duara, it does not only encompass the American empire against which the concept was devised by the New Left, but other states which articulated a new, avowedly anti-imperialist form of exploitation, involving the construction of modernising political and pedagogic institutions, extensive investment in infrastructure and industry, and particularly an

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6Shakya, Dragon, p. 108.
10Idem, p. 19.
11Idem, p. 36.
14Quoted in Kumar, Visions, p. 301.
erasure (at least legally) of that differentiation, ‘between ruler and ruled,’ or of, ‘unequal rule,’ traced by Doyle.

The PRC proclaimed equality in its nation-building across the canvas of the Qing Empire (barring Outer Mongolia), yet in reality entrenched an inequality between national minorities at the Tibetan periphery and the centre. Although described by Duara as ‘new imperialism’ primarily regarding Manchukuo, perhaps a more appropriate term in the PRC would be ‘developmental imperialism,’ since a metropole-imposed developmental state was key to this endeavour. Crucially, this conforms to John Darwin’s postulated type one late imperial state born as the 20th century rendered colonial night watchmen increasingly publicly and economically nonviable. To Mark Beissinger meanwhile, legal erasure of difference matters less than the imagination of alien control, an empire of perception which even filters into the mainly pro-PRC propagandistic material that this exploration discusses.

Sources on the PRC’s mentality include its own media, primarily the Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) produced by the US Consulate, Hong Kong, and the magazine China Reconstructs alongside select articles from 1950-67 collected by the Hong Kong Union Research Institute. SCMP and the Union Research Institute collection translate Chinese press domestic and foreign, while China Reconstructs is an example of PRC action specifically targeting outsiders, to quote, ‘The purpose of China Reconstructs is to present the work and achievements of the Chinese people to people abroad.’ These sources can be paired alongside the analyses conducted by contemporary imperial powers into events behind the ‘Bamboo Curtain’, the FO and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Careful parsing of such material, considering the variegated subjectivities across and within said sources over time, indicates that 1951-9 saw PRC policy take form as a developmental imperialist exercise.

Secondary historiography includes the work of Tsering Shakya and especially Melvyn C. Goldstein, considered by John Powers (in 2004) the closest approximation of a balanced

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16Doyle, Empires, p. 36.
Tibetan history considering the highly politicised discipline.\(^{21}\) Although the academy has often articulated themes of domination and marginalisation regarding Tibet,\(^{22}\) the extent to which ‘imperialism’ or ‘colonialism’ has been described beyond pejoratives remains distinctly limited. In a brief article mainly featuring the 1960s PRC, Carole McGranahan has commented, ‘Our ability to think critically about empire as a Tibetan reality or about Tibetan experiences as distinctly imperial remains undeveloped.’\(^{23}\) Sulmaan Khan’s work on the Tibetan borderlands has made some strides, especially in his conceptualisation of the PRC’s, ‘hard empire,’\(^{24}\) following 1959, this securitisation constituting the third world absorbing the, ‘fourth world.’\(^{25}\) His analysis however focusses more on the border itself and 1950s-1960s Sino-Indian relations than on placing development within Chinese state extension.\(^{26}\) Benno Ryan Weiner’s excavation of what he sees as empire to nation transition in Amdo’s Zeku County has also posited new claims, a transition in Qinghai undercut by impatience among metropolitan policy figures and leftists on the ground over the pace of that transition, resulting in a failure of the nation more than the revival of empire.\(^{27}\)

Nevertheless, little of this has yet focussed an imperial lens holistically on ‘Tibet’ itself, a Tibet which in this discussion of metropolitan mentality adopts the contours of the Tibet Autonomous Region finally demarcated by that very metropole in 1965, ‘the PRC’s Tibet,’ if you will.\(^{28}\) In aiming to think critically about empire as a Tibetan reality,\(^{29}\) this dissertation concludes that developmental imperialism in the PRC constituted an intersection, not Weiner’s transition-derailing antagonism,\(^{30}\) between socialism and imperialism, a co-dependency which can be viewed as a systematic governing strategy. This was the genesis of a socialist empire.

Firstly, vast energies were poured into infrastructure to physically manifest central government control (Chapter 1). Concurrently, scientific teams prospected the Tibetan plateau for mineral resources. This was explicitly justified to both external and internal audiences as securing the


\(^{22}\)Excepting PRC state historiography.


\(^{24}\)Sulmaan W. Khan, *Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China’s Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands* (Chapel Hill, 2015), p. 89.

\(^{25}\)Idem, pp. 3-5.

\(^{26}\)Idem, pp. 35ff.


\(^{28}\)Amdo was outside this demarcation.


development not only of the Tibetan region but of the motherland/fatherland proper and represented a movement beyond neo-colonial resource extraction towards the building of a genuine developmental state. In this, the PLA was depicted as a source of agricultural and technical expertise offering a helping hand to Tibetans, significantly masking their position as an occupying military.

Secondly, a ‘soft’ developmental imperialism took root (Chapter 2). Marxist-Leninist modernisation provided public healthcare, while a new generation of Tibetans attended proliferating secular schools and a proliferation of new youth associations. Donald Lopez has noted, ‘we might regard Tibet as a work of art, fashioned through exaggeration and selection into an ideal with little foundation in history.’ Applied there to Euro-American Tibet romance, it was equally applicable to 1951-9; PRC media proclaimed, detailed and so tried to pedagogically condition a situation of cooperation in the construction of New China.

Thirdly, developmental imperialism was not articulated monolithically (Chapter 3). The PRC’s agents conflicted over various matters during this period, most notably during Tibet’s battle against ‘Han Chauvinism’ and ‘Local Nationalism’, although alleged Han Chauvinism shall assume main focus for the interests of scope. This wider interplay within the overall PRC was to a great extent personalised in Tibet through the dissenting position of Fan Ming on gradualism, a position which was nonetheless, ‘subimperial,’ united front work as he attempted to elevate an alternative indigenous elite, the Panchen Lama, and through him accelerate socialist transformation.

Finally (Chapter 4), The imperial contours of PRC action in Tibet can further be illuminated through comparison, not only with the Soviet Union’s minority nationality struggles but with the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. Indeed, China Reconstructs appears to have an antecedent in the Japanese magazine Contemporary Manchuria. Duara’s suggestion that Manchukuo illuminates the artificiality of the Asian nation-state can thus be developed; Manchukuoan propaganda’s comparability to the PRC’s also indicates the hollow nature of both polities’ claims to anti-imperialism.

31Lichtheim, Imperialism, p. 128.
33Weiner, following Uradyn Bulag, Frontier, p. 25.
Chapter 1

‘All domination involves invasion- at times physical and overt, at times camouflaged, with the invader assuming the role of a helping friend.’

In *On the Ten Major Relationships*, Mao turned in relationship six to China’s minority nationalities, ‘it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich…We must sincerely and actively help the minority nationalities to develop their economy and culture.’ Such sincere work in practice constituted the extraction of Tibetan resources for wider China’s industrialisation and an enforced integration through Tibet’s emmeshing into a national highway network. The PLA’s centring within this ‘hard’ developmental imperialist discourse and policy further constituted a state attempt to reinvent its proverbial ‘stick’ as a ‘carrot’ aiding in regional advancement.

**Strategic Infrastructure**

From mid-1951 40,000 troops and civilian workers extended the highway built through Xikang towards Tibet proper, the PRC then broadening this programme into the construction of the first motorable road network Tibet had ever seen. The manner this network was promoted provides a first indication of developmental imperialist mentality.

On 20 October 1955, Fan Ming, deputy secretary of the Tibet Work Committee (TWC) reported progress, ‘These two newly-opened roads [Lhasa-Shigatse and Shigatse-Gyantse] yet again indicate the concern and care which the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao, the great leader of the various nationalities in the fatherland, have for the Tibetan people.’ Furthermore, ‘henceforth the link between Tibet and the hinterland areas of the fatherland will become much closer as motor cars replace the primitive means of transport.’ The aegis of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leader was bound to the modern nation-building project, this furthermore linking Tibet to a wider ‘fatherland’. Such messaging was continuous.

On 10 January 1957, Xinhua Lhasa published two articles. One celebrated Lhasa-Zhedang highway completion, shortening a five-day journey, ‘either by horseback or by canoe,’ to one

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day via motor vehicle. This marvel was commemorated by, ‘Just over 1,000 people of all walks of life [gathered]… to celebrate another victory of the Tibetan people.’\(^{39}\) Another article, ‘Highway Network Basically Formed in Tibet,’ claimed, ‘more than 6,000 kilometres of motor roads have been opened to traffic.’\(^{40}\) Apparently the network was not in fact basically formed, as on 25 March 1957 Xinhua-English announced, ‘Three New Highways to Be Built in Southern Tibet.’\(^{41}\) The CCP thus claimed Tibetan transformation; a region of, ‘primitive,’\(^ {42}\) canoes and horses steadily became traversable via a vast and continuously growing road network. Connection to the fatherland had moreover ended Tibetan isolation, a fact messaged not as a cause for concern, but as, ‘victory for the Tibetan people.’\(^ {43}\)

Regarding those very people, an interesting aspect of the highway program was the valorisation of its builders. PRC media extolled those working on Tibetan infrastructure to discursively construct a working class. *China Reconstructs* reported on roadbuilding, including the bridging of the treacherous Nu River. Deputy Platoon Commander Zui Ximin carried wire across for a temporary bridge, before daringly sliding down thirty feet of sheer rock to a safe ledge. The characters, ‘Hero’s Stand,’ were etched into the chasm, and Ximin was decorated.\(^{44}\) This article, penned for foreign audiences, not only served to humanise participants in the building work but to demonstrate the qualitative difference of the PRC from its predecessors. The anonymous working-class hero was no longer necessarily anonymous. Xinhua English also explicitly reported, ‘Tibetan nationality,’ participation in this activity, in July 1958 noting Qinghai-Tibet highway builders received paid vacation at Beidaihe. Advertising the new workers of their workers’ state, the PRC again compared itself to the past; the resort was, ‘open only to imperialists and compradores before liberation.’\(^ {45}\)

Foreign observers held less sanguine views. The Tibetan network was clearly strategic. On 10 February 1955, the British Embassy in Beijing commented on the Qinghai and Xinjiang highways: ‘at present neither the border areas nor Tibet itself can be of sufficient economic importance to warrant the construction of two major roads of this kind. Their principal purpose is presumably to enable the Chinese Government to maintain control and internal security in

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\(^{42}\)Tibet 1950-67, no. 14, p. 56.

\(^{43}\)SCMP, no. 1457, p. 25.

\(^{44}\)First Highways to Tibet’, *China Reconstructs*, May 1955, p. 9.

Tibet. If the need existed, the connection of Tibet to the, ‘motherland,’ could be utilised to impose control. The CIA’s post-mortem of the Lhasa Uprising further emphasised this fact, ‘The key to continued Chinese occupation of Tibet is the maintenance of their transportation links to bases in Kansu and Szechwan.’

Economically nonviable, militarily vital, from 1951-9 this developmental imperialist securitisation exercise nonetheless attempted to recast itself in a media narrative of reunification, working-class heroism and benevolent modernisation.

**Scientific Expeditions**

Following Liberation, scientists were dispatched to Tibet, prospecting the ‘returned’ province and tabulating its potential for national development. Changjiang Ribao reported on 5 June 1952 that a mission, commencing in October 1951, had indeed found, ‘many valuable resources.’ These scientists seem to have stayed for a considerable time. *China Reconstructs* June 1954 article, ‘Scientists in Tibet,’ noted, ‘In two years on the Tibet-Sikang plateau we found over thirty valuable minerals in approximately a hundred localities.’ Materials were not only to be extracted, instead, ‘We now have no doubt whatsoever that copper, iron, electrical, chemical and cement industries, among others, can be set up in Tibet.’ Primary resource prospecting came alongside aims to construct more significant electrical and chemical industry, corresponding to Darwin’s typology or Duara’s metric of an imperialism involving conscious development.

Finding borax occupied particular attention. The team moved west of Heiho chasing rumours of inland lakes, ‘some of which were reported to be rich in borax.’ Guided by locals they eventually found such a lake, raising the hackles of the CIA. The Economic Defense Intelligence Committee (EDIC), was asked by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce in March 1956 to investigate the importance of borax to the Sino-Soviet alliance. The lake mentioned in *China Reconstructs* in fact contained ten million tonnes of borax, eight of which was industrial grade.

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46 British Embassy, Beijing, 10 February 1955, TNA, FC1373/3 in ‘Chinese Political and Economic Consolidation of Tibet’, DO 35/8980, 1953-1959, unpaginated.


52 *China Reconstructs*, November-December 1954, pp. 30f.
according to *Far Eastern Economic Review*, ten years’ worth of US production. This request made it into a further meeting of EDIC on 5 April 1956, and despite precise information remaining classified appeared to be actioned; the present author discovered that the 1959 Lhasa Uprising post-mortem can place the lake at Pangog-Tso, 160 kilometres west of Heiho, and described it as one of China’s two main sources of the strategic mineral. The importance of the PRC’s prospecting was well understood by external observers.

As with highway construction, scientific modernity was furthermore conceived as conquering essentialist Tibetan primitivism. A subheading of *Scientists in Tibet* described a, ‘Land of Contradictions.’ Despite Tibet’s mineral wealth, ‘the people, with a few exceptions, were cooking in crude pots hollowed out of soap stone.’ This was all the more bemusing since, ‘There was iron ore almost everywhere that we went, and evidence that it was once mined.’ Signs existed that, ‘The Tibetans were once a thriving people.’ Not only was the region backward, but the Tibetan, incapable of exploiting his/her natural resources, appeared to have devolved. PRC protection was seemingly imperative; Tibetans were allegedly reduced to this state through imperialism, ‘invasion and intrigues from abroad,’ against which despite heroic resistance, ‘they were unable to overcome them until the liberation.’ Left to their own devices, the Tibetan masses regressed from even basic exploitation of their virgin territory and were predated on by outsiders now driven away. The indigenes through the Party and its scientific modernity were being offered salvation. Little wonder, ‘Their warm friendship had already been won by the People’s Liberation Army,’ and that two years prior in the Changjiang Ribao article they had, ‘expressed sincere gratitude to Chairman Mao for his solicitude in their welfare.”

The PLA

The PLA’s apparent affinity with the Tibetan minority denotes a final element in hard developmental imperialist positioning; the presentation and utilisation of the central army’s technical and agricultural assistance, so blurring a reality of occupation.

PLA public relations work included agricultural experimentation. Delivering a speech at the 8th CCP Congress (15-27 September 1956), Zhang Guohua, vice-chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR) and TWC deputy secretary proclaimed, ‘During the past six years, the troops and government personnel have actively taken part in agricultural production and set up many model experimental farms and army-reclaimed farms.’ These partly alleviated supply issues, and, ‘more importantly, also set an example of agricultural production for the Tibetan people.’ Military farming provided a model for Tibetan citizens to emulate, the PLA reconceptualised as a companion in regional modernisation. Developmental support could also be presented as spontaneous; in 1958, ‘troops stationed in Shigatse decided to build an irrigation canal that will serve 300,000 mow of land.’ This presentation appears a clear exercise in deflection: the army offering help out of the kindness its heart comes in the context of 1958 Chushi Gangdruk penetration of ‘PRC’s Tibet’ and continued bushfire warfare in Kham and Amdo. Indeed, an earlier article indicates how clearly PLA aid aimed at image management. Entitled, ‘Harmonious Army-Civilian Relationship in Tibet,’ this subtle segment from January 1957 stated, ‘In Tibet, the relationship between the army and civilians is harmonious,’ and listed various proofs, including, ‘[soldiers] helped the Tibetan people reap the autumn crops, till the fields and repair the houses constantly.’ Military benevolence equated to home repairs and aiding the civilian harvest. Such statements of civilian-military support are symptomatic of what Carole McGranahan calls, ‘Chinese anxieties of rule;’ the manufacturing of a flat Tibetan consent, in this case obscuring

59Tibet 1950-67, no. 41, p. 199.
60PLA presence 1951-4 caused food shortages, Goldstein, Volume 2, pp. 245-265.
61Tibet 1950-67, no. 41, p. 199.
63Shakya, Dragon, pp. 163-184.
Kham, Amdo and Chamdo rebellions necessitating major PLA investment and startling Lhasa.66

The PLA furthermore involved itself in strategically significant Tibetan industrial works from 1951-9. For instance, The Lhasa Automobile Repair Works was managed by the, ‘Chinese People’s Liberation Army units in Tibet.’ 67 On 22 April 1958, the PCTAR’s second anniversary, the Panchen Lama spoke specifically about Tibetan development, noting that Tibet now proudly hosted, ‘hydro-electric and a thermo power stations, an automobile repair works, a serum factory and a borax plant.’68 Several articles that year commented on the latter works. In August, Tibet’s first steel was produced there,69 while by September 27 it had turned out an entire tractor.70 In January 1959, a piece on flying to Tibet highlighted the shop’s work, referencing the multinational cooperation between workers such as Wang Renqing, described as Tibetan, and Hu Linghua, a Han.71 The PLA, building industry at the Tibetan periphery, claimed a unity in labour between citizens rather than tension between occupier and native.

PLA positioning intersected with other elements in the PRC developmental state on 3 October 1958. That day, an industrial, agricultural and communications exhibition was opened in Lhasa by none other than Zhang Jinwu, secretary of the TWC. Guests- government, Tibetan official, noble and non-noble, meandered through 2,000 exhibits in over 10 pavilions, from a mining tent showcasing resources surveyed by the scientists, to a, ‘highway chart [which] shows that the highway now connect all the main cities and towns in Tibet and are extending to the outlying areas.’ Before one could do so however, you had to enter the first pavilion, the pavilion of, ‘the Tibetan military area of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,’ displaying that first steel and first tractor developed at the Lhasa Automobile Repair Plant. The exhibition ended with the agricultural pavilion and a military promise to indeed, ‘strive for self-sufficiency in grain in three to five years’ time.’72

This display of imperial pageantry showcased the success of socialist modernisation and especially the PLA in delivering such modernisation. Nonetheless, the process of prospecting,

68 Dalai’s and Panchen’s Speeches at Celebration Meeting’, NCNA-English, Lhasa, 22 April 1958, SCMP, no. 1758, p. 34.
69 ‘Tibet Trial-Produces Steel NCNA-English,’ Lhasa, 29 August 1958, SCMP, no. 1847, p. 31.
70 SCMP, no. 1868, p. 34.
72 Industrial, Agricultural and Communications Exhibition Opens in Lhasa,’ NCNA-English, Lhasa, 3 October 1958, SCMP, no. 1873, pp. 38f.
road-building and military image laundering from 1951-9 constituted a modernity of imperial exploitation. Resources, found and developed by the state, were utilised in wider China’s general industrialisation, while even before the periphery was capable of paying its way infrastructure bolted said periphery to the metropole.\textsuperscript{73} This was advertised using a consistent linguistic framework of benefaction, (usually) anonymous mass adulation for the CCP and claims that Tibetan society pre-1951 was primitive. Indeed, Tibetans could not be trusted to use Tibet’s natural resources without party-state guidance, a guidance which from 1951-9 concurrently had another ‘soft’ aspect, the pedagogic conditioning of compliance.

\textsuperscript{73}TNA, FC1373/3 in DO 35/8980, unpaginated.
Chapter 2

‘Pedagogy which begins with the egoistic interests of the oppressors (an egoism cloaked in the false generosity of paternalism) and makes the oppressed the objects of its humanitarianism, itself maintains and embodies oppression.’

The above quotation and that heading Chapter 1 are both drawn from Paolo Friere’s seminal *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. A treatise on revolutionary education, *Pedagogy* polemicizes against both the damaging moulding of subject peoples by dominating regimes and the vanguardism of Marxist-Leninist movements which can also distance themselves from the cultural, symbolic and developmental (in the sense of personal development) realities of those they aim to liberate, thus reproducing dominating imperial power relationships. In many ways, this critique applies to Tibet 1951-9. Socialism applied to Tibet and wider China from 1949 was inherently pedagogic; to quote Mao’s famous dictum his ultimate aim was to inscribe revolution into the, ‘poor and blank,’ Chinese masses. Without mass campaigns, Tibetan inscription consisted of cadre training, the rollout of secular educational institutions and associations and through them the introduction of a constellations of concepts broadly new to Tibetan society. Socialist intellectual development furthermore went alongside the extension of modern medical provision. Tibetans were to have their physical wellbeing assured, while their absorption of socialist praxis was encouraged by a media imagination of reality that once again conformed to the goals of the metropolitan state.

**Health**

The PRC advertised a break with the past through extending free medical care across China. On 1 April 1956 *Chinese Women* proclaimed, ‘The New Life of Tibetan Women and Children.’ It decried the misery of childbirth before Liberation, mothers often giving birth in fields and, ‘using stone slabs to cut the umbilical cords of the newborn baby.’ Contrast this to 1956, where since 1952 Lhasa People’s Hospital had delivered over 500 new babies via modern methods and vaccinated 37,000 children. Modernity’s conquest of primitivism appeared once more, but regarding the hospital was gendered as women’s liberation from particularly barbaric pre-1951 childbirth practices. Notions of feminine rejuvenation and by implication state rebirth

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74 Friere, *Pedagogy*, p. 28.
75 Idem, especially pp. 67-70 and pp. 133ff.
were then linked in the concluding paragraph, ‘The women and children of Tibet are the new blossoms in the highlands of the country.’

Focus on Lhasa People’s Hospital corroborates these assertions. Consecutive articles ran on 21 and 22 November 1957 in Xinhua English and Xinhua respectively. The first noted the opening of the hospital’s new polyclinic. State interest was clear; it was opened by none other than Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, PCTAR general secretary, Kashag Shape, former commander at the Battle of Chamdo and a leading progressive aristocrat working with the PRC and CCP. The following day, ‘People’s Hospital of Lhasa Acclaimed by All,’ this time not in Xinhua English and so presumably addressed domestically, presented hard statistics- 490,000 cases treated, a fall from, ‘a surprising 80 percent,’ to eight percent infant mortality. Backwardness and isolation before Liberation poorly compared to development and integration after it, especially since without integration both hospitals would suffer a chronic lack of personnel, the article of 21 November admitting, ‘The hospital is mainly staffed by doctors from the interior at present.’ Tibetans had been trained as, ‘nurses and midwives,’ but other, ‘Tibetan medical personnel,’ were still learning modern medicine. The wider motherland was thus vital for medical development and the production of surviving offspring, the future of the Tibetan people and wider motherland. The state moreover through its medical establishments brought childbirth within its purview when it had formerly occurred outside it, indeed the media claimed in fields. It then categorised this transformation via the production of statistics which could advertise both to PRC readers and to the wider world the success of its enterprise at the periphery, justifying its very presence. State and people, governmentality and gender were closely bound up, with traditional Tibetan healthcare entirely dismissed through narratives of gratuitous horror, the cutting of umbilical cords with rocks and so on.

78Idem, p. 65.
80People’s Hospital of Lhasa Acclaimed by Tibetans’, NCNA Lhasa, 22 November 1957, SCMP, no. 1666, p. 45.
81SCMP, no. 1660, p. 23.
82Tibet 1950-67, no. 16, p. 63.
83For more see Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures and an Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago, 1991), edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, pp. 87-104.
84Tibet 1950-67, no. 16, p. 62.
Education, Cadre Mobilisation and Popular Associations

From 1951-9, Tibet was remodelled from a region, ‘where there were not public primary schools for the children of Tibet,’\(^{85}\) to one with seventy-nine secular, state-run educational establishments and over 6,000 students by 1957 alone.\(^{86}\) Such education was imperative for the production of a new generation of Tibetans accustomed to integration with wider China who could run the new society.

The PRC opened its gates to the transfer of promising Tibetan youths to various Minority Institutes up to the Central Minority Institute in Beijing. In, ‘Two Girls from Shigatse,’ *China Reconstructs* personalised this effort, reporting on two young women studying at the Southwest Institute for National Minorities in Chengdu. The first, Chunda, voiced her gratitude to Beijing. Formerly, ‘a whole lifetime of work wouldn’t have earned me enough to travel even a small part of the distance, and I wouldn’t have been free to go anyhow.’ Now, ‘her tuition and living expenses had been paid for by the government.’ Chunda, ‘knows that general education is necessary…later she may take up a specialty.’\(^{87}\) ‘Specialty,’ is the key word within this passage. As with medical personnel (p. 20), the rapid build-up of modernised infrastructure and amenities in Tibet did not keep up with the training of locals in the operation of said infrastructure. This posed a major, continuing issue for Party indigenisation of rule, motivating state focus on the youth of Tibet to close this gap.

Particularly important was the task of indigenising the institutions created to replace the, ‘Local Government.’ The PCTAR was from formation chaired by the Dalai Lama with the Panchen Lama as his vice-chairman, but significant work was required to percolate Tibetan minority staff down to local branches.\(^{88}\) Zhang Guohua reported at 8\(^{th}\) CCP Congress, ‘in training Tibetan cadres during the past six years, the work has been [proceeding] quite slowly,’\(^{89}\) and promised improvement. It is worth noting this statement was made following the September Instructions for Fan Ming to slow efforts on full-blown reforms in Chamdo (pp. 28-29). A push for properly trained cadre mobilisation was consistent, and the press regularly commented on enrolment. On 16 December 1956 Lhasa Tibet Daily (Tibet Ribao) reported that the Nagchu

\(^{85}\) ‘Middle School to Be Opened in Lhasa This Year’, NCNA, Lhasa, 3 March 1956, *SCMP*, no. 1249, p. 11.
\(^{87}\) ‘Two Girls from Shigatse’, *China Reconstructs*, April 1956, pp. 27f.
\(^{88}\) Shakya, *Dragon*, pp. 126-134.
\(^{89}\) *Tibet 1950-67*, no. 41, p. 200.
CCP branch had enrolled 125 new cadres, 61 of them Tibetan.\textsuperscript{90} This enrolment’s framing is of interest. Krishan Kumar in his survey of empire suggests almost every imperial project has a civilising mission.\textsuperscript{91} At Nagchu, the very act of joining the Party improved work and civilised participants, ‘The Tibetan workers by the names of Ko-ma-p’ing-ts’o and So-cha… paid much attention to making thrift use of the state capital, to submit actively the rational recommendations to the higher level, to improve their technique, to take an initiative role with making contacts with the masses.’ Two individuals, buoyed by their encompassing in party-state infrastructure, improved both their work efficiency and their temperament towards, ‘the masses.’\textsuperscript{92} Note also in the quotation the tying of such behavioural development to state development— their saving of state resources and improving labour productivity was referenced first, before their improved relationship with the populus.

This fits Friere’s analysis of prescription. An outside force, imposing their vision of a subject’s proper behaviour, ends up, ‘transforming the consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the prescriber’s consciousness.’\textsuperscript{93} The Tibetan worker, through Party membership, was conditioned into a model citizen with prescribed action patterns aiding the purpose of developmental imperialism, and then through the press was elevated as an example to be emulated. What was to be emulated was meanwhile the PRC’s values and aims for development, not those of ‘traditional’ Tibetan society caricatured thus far as backward in industry, infrastructure, science and healthcare. Prescription continued via the Tibet Patriotic Youth Association. One of the many mass organisations rolled out in Tibet, this group was employed in August 1957 to positively message party policy. Following the rollback of Chamdo’s reforms (pp. 28-29), at a meeting of thirty Association committee members and group leaders one, ‘Kiang-lo-chin-she,’ agreed that the, ‘Central Committee’s policy of,” no reform in six years,” is correct.’ An unnamed member also noted it was, ‘safe, positive, and aimed at the creation of still better conditions for future reforms…we must correctly understand this policy’s positive significance.’\textsuperscript{94} Whether such opinions were actually voiced is moot, the value of this article was its proclamation of said ‘facts’ as objectively ‘correct’ by a manifestly and manifested patriotic next Tibetan generation. Through engaging in the educational

\textsuperscript{90}Group of Tibetan, Han Youths Join CCP in Nagchuka, Tibet,’ Lhasa Tibet Ribao, 16 December 1956, SCMP, no. 1467, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{91}Kumar, Visions, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{92}SCMP, no. 1467, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{93}Friere, Pedagogy, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{94}Tibet Patriotic Youth Association Discuss the Correct Policy of “No Reform in Six Years”, Lhasa Tibet Ribao, 9 August 1957, SCMP, no. 1634, p. 43.
development and mobilisation of workers and the youth, then utilising said workers and youth as vehicles to promote state policies, the PRC conducted precisely the theoretical erasure of ruler and ruled missed by Doyle but seen by Duara and Darwin as part and parcel of imperial developmentalist thinking.\textsuperscript{95} The ‘ruled’ spoke for the ruler.

A fascinating FO excerpt however indicates such activities were not entirely successful in embedding local role models. Analysing the PCTAR’s 1958 report on continuing gradual reforms, British officials noted that the ula had finally been abolished. However, this was supposedly not because a labour corvée was anathema to a socialist state (which indeed used it to build its highways\textsuperscript{96}). The obligation was instead ended following an, ‘incident which occurred in Gyantse in mid-September when a local official of the old school administered a two hours’ beating to a young Tibetan cadre who had not done his “ula”.’ No citizen intervened as the patriotic youth was assaulted, instead state organs had to, arresting the official and his wife and forcing a public apology to the Gyantse Tibetan Cadres Training Corps. As a result, ‘People from all walks of life were enjoined to give active support and assistance to the cadres and, “prohibited from directly or indirectly persecuting them”.’\textsuperscript{97} In entering Tibet, producing a dazzling array of associations and promoting Marxist-Leninist modernity in a novel context, the PRC appeared to have departed from what Friere called the, ‘thematic universe,’ of concepts, relatable themes and believed-in notions among the people.\textsuperscript{98} State press consistently instructed a ‘correct’ series of behaviours in line with metropolitan developmental ideals, which could apparently be so alienating that in this case the popular response was mute, allowing an ‘old society’ official to assault a young agent of the future the PRC claimed Tibetans desired. Unequal rule was expressed in the apathy of those allegedly experiencing national equality for the first time.\textsuperscript{99}

Through healthcare and education, the PRC from 1951-9 engaged in a soft developmental imperialism alongside physically organising Tibet and its resources, hoping to transform youths and workers into effective interlocutors and models for wider society through socialist education. The intersection between socialism and imperialism was meanwhile demonstrated in how that socialist model Tibetan worker was presented wholly through their usefulness to

\textsuperscript{96}Albeit they were paid, Goldstein, \textit{Volume 2}, p. 415.
\textsuperscript{97}British Embassy, Beijing, 5 June 1958, ‘1958 Internal Political Situation in Tibet’, TNA, FO 371/133709, unpaginated.
\textsuperscript{98}Friere, \textit{Pedagogy}, p. 69.
the new state in bridging the gap to the masses and more importantly in their productive efficiency, while the new cadre or Youth Association member was used to legitimate Party directives with an indigenous voice. Simultaneously, the PRC claimed women’s liberation and the rejuvenation of Tibet through modern medicine, depicting pre-Liberation Tibetan healthcare as beyond poor, barbarous even, thus highlighting the brighter future brought by uniting Tibet with the wider motherland.
Chapter 3

‘Almost never however, does a revolutionary leadership group perceive that it constitutes a contradiction to the people. Indeed, this perception is painful, and the resistance may serve as a defence mechanism.’

Goldstein has emphasised that considering the PRC to be a monolithic entity is a consistent error in much Tibet scholarship. A similar error would be to suggest that developmental imperialism in Tibet was uniformly employed without dissent among those working to implement it. Investigating such debate nonetheless reveals the flexibility of the socialist-imperial development framework as a synergy of socialism-with and socialism-through imperialism, rather than socialism-against imperialism.

Inside the Party-State; Fan Ming, Han Chauvinism, and the Battle Over Indigenous Elites

The PRC not only aimed to eroot its control through local youth, but furthermore engaged in direct united front co-option of indigenous elites. United front work in its basic form aimed to smooth state extension and resolve the tension between the imperative for such extension with Mao Zedong Thought’s revolutionary idealism, through the co-option of non-proletarian, non-peasant figures to serve state ends. In minority districts the United Front Work Department (UFWD) courted indigenous elites, socialising them to the Party project in a strategy Weiner describes as ‘subimperial’ following Uradyn Bulag. This resulted in the agreement that the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama would chair and vice-chair the PCTAR in 1956, before that touring China’s interior as Tibetan delegates to the 1954 National People’s Congress. The Foreign Office sneered with a hint of concern that, ‘Without question, the city of Peking, where they were thoroughly indoctrinated, (INTSUM 4472), is the nearest thing to modern society that either ever has seen or imagined.’ The PRC hoped and the FO feared that, ‘Their praise of the new regime undoubtedly is genuine, and their followers probably will accept their glowing reports on the “New Order” at face value.’

References

Friere, Pedagogy, p. 138.
Goldstein, Volume 3, p. 11.
Weiner, Frontier, pp. 29-37.
Idem, p. 33.
Goldstein, Volume 2, pp. 478-522.
TNA, FT1015/12 in FCO 371/115372, unpaginated.
interlocutors illuminates state debates around socialist-imperial goals and their presentation with an indigenous face.

The case of Fan Ming shall suffice. In 1949 Fan, the PLA’s lead on minorities in Qinghai and Gansu for the Northwest Bureau (NWB), was ordered by Peng Dehuai to convince the exiled 10th Panchen Lama to cooperate with the PRC and enter Tibet with the PLA.106 Fan himself followed the army to Tibet, remaining there until his career ended during the Party Rectification following the Anti-Rightist Campaign.107

Until his 1958 defenestration, Fan repeatedly clashed with nominally superior Southwest Bureau (SWB) colleagues, Zhang Guohua especially, on whether to raise the Panchen Lama from his theoretical submission to the Dalai Lama (who Fan distrusted) to an equal autonomy.108 He seemed proud of the part he played in returning the Panchen, penning a 1956 editorial claiming, ‘the Tibet local government and Panchen Ngoerhtehni have become united, and the historical differences outstanding the two parties have been solved justly and reasonably,’109 and aimed to elevate him as a mouthpiece to promote faster reform. Such actions by 1957 had the FO reporting Indian opinion that the lama was a, ‘Chinese stooge.’110

Despite defeat at the Tibet Work Conference in Beijing in 1953, presided over by Li Weihan, UFWD director, with Mao’s and Deng Xiaoping’s input,111 Fan’s continued lobbying can be found bleeding into developmental imperialist media proclamations. His 20 October 1955 report on roadbuilding (p. 11) implied that the Lhasa-Shigatse and Shigatse-Gyantse highways were built collaboratively, ‘In the course of the road building work, the regional government of Tibet and the Panchen Council mobilised all the people along the road to support the construction project.’ The, ‘Panchen Council,’ was separated from the, ‘regional government of Tibet,’ as a partner in the Shigatse region where the Panchen had his seat.112 Quietly slid into the panegyric was thus a notion that the Party was dealing not with one local government

106Goldstein, Volume 2, p. 271.
108Goldstein, Volume 2, pp. 422-453.
110India’s Relations with Tibet 1953-7’, 4 March 1957, TNA, DO 35/6710, p. 2.
111Goldstein, Volume 2, pp. 435-453.
in Tibet, but several. Again, this was despite the Central Committee considering the Dalai Lama’s pre-eminence settled.113

The inauguration of the PCTAR from 22 April 1956 left Fan de facto head of the TWC placing his appointees in the local UFWD.114 Shigatse’s development appeared in the press with increasing regularity. During the inauguration the Panchen Lama reported progress, ‘established 15 primary schools and 2 medical schools, serving more than 1,000 students, organised studies by officials at various levels, established the Shigatze Municipal People’s Hospital…built the Shigatze agricultural experimental farms.’ Although this was not presented as outright superior to Lhasa, it was a success in its own right; developmental progress listed as a marker legitimating the specifically referenced, ‘Panchen Kanpo Lija.’115 On 22 March 1957 Xinhua’s article, ‘More Tibetan Cadres in Shigatse,’ meanwhile reported that in under a year since Zhang Guohua’s injunction that more Tibetan cadres should be trained, eighty percent of Shigatse’s PCTAR branch was Tibetan.116

Laudations proceeded alongside a process collectively described as the, ‘Great Expansion.’117 Reinterpreting PCTAR meeting minutes stipulating peaceful democratic reforms should not yet begin (he’d again been outvoted), Fan commenced, ‘putting democratic reforms on the calendar,’118 having the Panchen at PCTAR inauguration propose to, ‘first carry out experiments in our area,’119 and then using his own position as TWC head to import thousands of cadres from the interior and rapidly train Tibetans for trial land reforms in Chamdo.120 His preference for what could be termed more socialism within Tibet’s socialist reconstruction was clear, yet nonetheless that preference was articulated ‘subimperially’ through a cooperative native elite, more progressive than the Lhasa he aimed to pressure, but an elite regardless.121 His work again bled into media, including two stories on 2 June 1956, the first of which, ‘Achievements in Training Tibetan Cadres in Chamdo Area,’ reporting that the 4th People’s Representative Conference resolved to train 300 further cadres and send 800 youths to the

113Goldstein, Volume 2, p. 452.
114Goldstein, Volume 3, p. 304, p. 314.
115‘Internal political situation in Tibet’, 1956, TNA, FO 371/121146, unpaginated.
117Goldstein, Volume 3, p. 305.
120Goldstein, Volume 3, pp. 309f.
121Idem, pp. 284f.
interior, the second noting, ‘All the representatives unanimously supported the proposals of conducting democratic and social reforms in the Tibetan area.’ In fact, these moves precipitated a rebellion, leading to the Central Committee’s 4th September Instructions specifically forbidding further reform since, ‘the conditions for doing reforms in Tibet are not present.’

Following these Instructions, Xizang Ribao published, ‘Problems Existing in the Building Construction Administration at Shigatse.’ Effectively a hit piece, the exposé began when a young worker stood up and asked: “Comrades, can you (meaning the paper) back us? We have many problems which we cannot solve.” This plea was supported by the local trade union chairman, precipitating a catalogue of complaints including, ‘Treating the Workers with a Bureaucratic Attitude…Fallacious Ideas and Conditions Concerning the Training of Tibetan Cadres…Serious State of Waste.’ Although Fan was not directly attacked (that dubious honour goes to one Director Chin), public exposure of malpractice in Fan’s pet region could only reflect poorly on him, and may represent the attach by allegory so often used in the PRC to bring down high ranking figures. Of further interest was the angle of attack; waste at a construction administration, a developmental agency, the compromising of which clearly seemed to be beyond the pale in a regime tying imperial legitimacy to such development.

This conflict drew on wider currents. The article’s second heading, ‘Fallacious Ideas and Conditions Concerning the Training of Tibetan Cadres,’ detailed the abuse of Tibetan recruits. Director Chin, having accepted just three Tibetan cadres into his administration, even stopped working with them, ‘thinking that as these Tibetan cadres could not speak the Han dialect they could do nothing much (actually they were not given any work to do).’ This filtered down, ‘Another Han cadre, Ho Yung-chi… asked a Tibetan worker to sprinkle lime water onto the stone work for him; when a few drops of lime water splashed on his clothes, he took a stick and beat up the Tibetan worker.’ Although the phrase is absent, suggestions of Han

123 ‘4th People’s Representative Conference of Chamdo Area Closed’, NCNA, Chamdo, 2 June 1956, SCMP, no. 1310, p. 18.
124 Goldstein, *Volume 3*, pp. 311-318.
125 Quoted in *idem*, p. 328.
126 *Tibet 1950-67*, no. 51, pp. 252-255.
127 *idem*, p. 255.
Chauvinism/Great Hanism shadow the piece. First explicated by Mao in 1953,\textsuperscript{130} this term, transliterated from Great Russianism,\textsuperscript{131} referred to Han disdain for minority nationalities. Minorities, classified socioeconomically as ‘backward’ (pp. 33-34), were then treated prejudicially as inherently inferior and primitive compared to Han society by nature of their nationality.\textsuperscript{132} For Mao, this represented a holdover from an oppressive past and reflected his politicisation of class as a situation where remnant old society thinking could corrode revolution.\textsuperscript{133} Such behaviour often dismissed the united front, taking a ‘left’ position on national minority issues that development should go alongside genuine mass line class struggle and the deconstruction not co-opt of elite authority, as indeed occurred from 1949 in rural Han China and through the Three Anti Campaign and Five Anti Campaign in urban Han China.\textsuperscript{134} A variant of the latter, ‘peaceful democratic reforms’, was also extended from 1955 to all minority regions bar Tibet in the drive towards cooperativisation, where its homogenising impulse (weapon confiscations especially) sparked rebellion in Kham.\textsuperscript{135} This triggered Friere’s, ‘defence mechanism,’\textsuperscript{136} inflamed metropolitan security concerns, worsened by the Hundred Flowers’ outpouring of minority hostility to Party rule.\textsuperscript{137} From early 1958 state attention therefore flipped to ‘Local Nationalism’; national minority demands for self-determination, secession or anti-Han hostility conceptualised as flowing from the same ‘tree’ of historic oppressor-oppressed relations as Han Chauvinism.\textsuperscript{138}

In 1956 however Han Chauvinism was still strongly opposed as, ‘not very much different from the ideology of the feudal landlord class or the exploiting ideology of the bourgeois class.’\textsuperscript{139} By connecting problems in Shigatse to this current, opponents of Fan Ming conflated his position with said Han Chauvinism, despite the fact that as noted he telegraphed much of his expansion through an indigene, the Panchen Lama (in May 1957 he actually aroused Zhang Guohua’s ire for speaking against the very Han Chauvinism he was earlier shadow accused of,

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\textsuperscript{131}For example, V.I Lenin, ‘Notes on the Question of Nationalities or “Autonomisation,”’ 31 December 1922, Testament, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1922/dec/testament/autonomy.htm.

\textsuperscript{132}Tibet 1950-67, no. 56, p. 267.


\textsuperscript{134}Spence, Search, pp. 461-463, 480-483.

\textsuperscript{135}Goldstein, Volume 3, pp. 119-140.

\textsuperscript{136}Friere, Pedagogy, p. 138.

\textsuperscript{137}Shakya, Dragon, pp. 164-168.


\textsuperscript{139}Tibet 1950-67, no. 56, p. 267.
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Guohua perceiving an attack on his SWB\textsuperscript{140}). This attack on hasty reforms was meanwhile situated around suggestions of developmental imperialist failure at a construction administration, in the same way that Fan/the Panchen originally justified acceleration by claiming developmental success in Shigatse. Han Chauvinism was framed as a true issue due to it disrupting national development, resulting in Tibetan cadres left idle, or Tibetan workers being assaulted by arrogant Han officials.

The messaging of development thus served as a structure within which individuals who collectively constituted the institutions of the PRC state could contend over policy positioning, and yet the semantics of the messaging remained broadly consistent. Indeed, allegorical attacks did not stop Fan Ming; articles such as that on eighty percent of Shigatse’s PCTAR being Tibetan continued to promote the area’s (and thus his NWB’s) success.\textsuperscript{141} When the issue was finally settled and Fan reassigned to direct post-Hundred Flowers Anti Rightist Rectification (he would end up a, ‘rightist’, an irony again demonstrating the personalisation of institutional politics in PRC\textsuperscript{142}), the, ‘correct’, decision of ‘no reform in six years’ was as noted (pp. 23), telegraphed through indigenised means via among other groups the Youth Association.\textsuperscript{143}

Fan Ming’s vision of the Panchen forging ahead illuminates the durability of a flexible imperial form; debate did exist on how fast reform in Tibet should take place within the socialist empire’s borderlands development, and yet that debate was emmeshed in a continuous language and framework of just that borderlands development. The problem of, Han Chauvinism within the party hierarchy became a weapon in intraparty conflict, those accused of it specifically implied to be derailing national reconstruction. Developmental imperialism as the underpinning of Tibetan return to the motherland was not questioned, indeed imperialist and socialist imperatives worked in tandem rather than in opposition. Even dissenters such as Fan telegraphed socialist acceleration through the ‘subimperial’ cooperation of Tibet’s second religiopolitical figure.

\textsuperscript{140}Shakya, \textit{Dragon}, pp. 167-168.
\textsuperscript{141}\textsc{SCMP}, no. 1498, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{142}Goldstein, \textit{Volume 4}, pp. 204-211.
\textsuperscript{143}\textsc{SCMP}, no. 1634, p. 43.
Chapter 4

‘An epoch is characterised by a complex of ideas, concepts, hopes, doubts, values and challenges in dialectical interaction with their opposites, striving towards plenitude.’

Comparison between the PRC and other imperial regimes demonstrates the embedding of developmentalism within state policy and its influences from abroad, indicating that the PRC’s developmental imperialism was hardly unique but truly was part of an epoch of mid-20th century imperial experimentation.

The Soviet Union’s 1920s and PRC’s 1950s: Minority Classification and the Surrogate Proletariat.

To many observers the minority policies and imperialisms of USSR and PRC can appear similar; the USSR after all invented the schema of minority nationality. Defining the nation was Stalin’s first scholarly effort, while Lenin meanwhile dictated, ‘Notes on the Question of Nationalities or “Autonomisation,”’ as one of his last political acts alongside his more famous Testament.

Lenin and Stalin’s postulations directly impacted the PRC, as from 1949 New China officially classified minorities following Soviet methods. Stalin’s original 1913 Marxism and the National and Colonial Question defined a nation as a group with a common language, territory, mode of production and psychology (often elided with culture). Lenin focussed on psychology, in his Notes recapitulating, ‘it is necessary to compensate the non-Russian for the lack of trust, for the suspicion and the insults to which the government of the “dominant” nation subjected them in the past.’ Stalin himself, People’s Commissar for Nationalities from 1917-23, cared more about developing the mode of production among ‘backward’ minority peoples, and crucially by 1923 came to champion investment and economic development through national territorial autonomy to catch minorities up with their advanced Russian brethren. A developmental notion of nations thus already existed by 1949, and PRC nationalities would

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144Friere, Pedagogy, p. 74.
147Thomas S. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley, 2011), p. 89.
148Ibid, p. 89.
150Hirsch, Empire of Nations, p. 96, note this differed from Gosplan’s purely economic bent, pp. 66-96.
find themselves placed on a Soviet socioeconomic scale; pre-capitalist, slave, feudal, capitalist or socialist societies. Only the latter two were full nationalities to Stalin.¹⁵¹ Through Lin Yaohua’s lobbying, this was somewhat moderated; more weight was to be put on the ethnolinguistic aspect and the first three forms of society (under which near-all Chinese ethnic minorities could be bracketed) were also to be nationalities, but bar these tacit caveats the Soviet system was claimed as the bedrock of PRC minority definition.¹⁵² Ubiquitous references to Tibetan culture, economy and society as ‘backward’ and notions that, ‘Equality Means Economic Growth,’¹⁵³ therefore derive significantly from a Soviet playbook.

Further closeness between the USSR’s and PRC’s minority nationality policies is perceptible in their joint search for surrogate proletariats. In Central Asia, the Bolshevik search for labouring masses in a region lacking substantial wage-labour eventually developed into a state focus on women to collapse traditional society. Confronting Turkestan’s social bricolage, the party-state’s republican organs and the Women’s Department (Zhenodetl) poured energy into forging a female-poor peasant alliance to pull the keystone from religious and tribal loyalty networks which remained resistant to land reform and Soviet rule.¹⁵⁴ This culminated in the Hujum, where the Party co-opted a small indigenous movement of unveiling among progressive Jadid intellectuals and some Party members into a process of coerced mass unveiling, beginning on Women’s Day 1927.¹⁵⁵ State agents such as Anna Liubimova and Anna Nukhrat demanded the liberation of women by law, education and finally in the symbolic removal of the paranji and chevron.¹⁵⁶ Liberated women were a visible marker of societal change, change claimed by the state. The response, for example Uzbek secret police reports littered with claims, ‘The Russians’ were aiming at destroying Islam and communalising the family, demonstrates a perception of foreign imposition despite the movement’s indigenous roots.¹⁵⁷ Douglas Northrop contended the resultant femicides (from 1927-9 especially) thus articulated anti-colonial resistance.¹⁵⁸ Gendered party salvation was not necessarily popular among those who saw it as an exercise of metropolitan control, a process perhaps mirrored in

¹⁵¹Mullaney, Coming to Terms, p. 89.
¹⁵²Idem, pp. 97-105.
¹⁵⁶Massell, Surrogate, pp. 136-141.
¹⁵⁸Kemp, New Woman, pp. 5-6, p. 202.
generational not gendered terms in the Tibetan case of popular apathy at the beating of the young cadre (p. 24).

Due to CCP desire to win over traditional elites and as in Central Asia an absence of wage-labour industry in 1951, Tibet’s transformation was also often advertised through gender surrogacy. ‘The New Life of Tibetan Women and Children,’ \(^{159}\) referenced in Chapter 2 (p. 19) described, ‘Tibetan women are the chief labour source both in society and in the family.’ \(^{160}\)

The piece then turned to post-Liberation, noting, ‘In an iron and wood factory in the military zone of Tibet, there is a 24 year-old Tibetan woman named Tsai-tan-chu, who worked here as a maid servant before the liberation… now, with the assistance of the Han workers and spurred by her own zeal to learn, she can make more than 100 different delicate parts.’ \(^{161}\)

Cai Tanzhu, uplifted by her Han elder brothers, had become a productive citizen industriously aiding national development. Just as the USSR claimed the women’s liberation movement in the Hujum, \(^{162}\) this surrogate proletarian (indeed she was now a real proletarian), furthermore had her freedom tied to PRC imperial occupation; after all, she was working in an iron wood factory set up, ‘in the military zone of Tibet.’ \(^{163}\)

Gender, the search for a proletariat, and the developed nationality’s helping hand intersected in the PRC in a very similar way to the USSR of 1920s.

**Manchukuo and the PRC Abroad; Developmental Imperialism and Outside Audiences**

The PRC can however be compared to another formation; Manchukuo. Constituted following Japanese conquest in 1932, Manchukuo developed a strategy showcasing its development (industrial output tripled 1933-42 \(^{164}\) ) alongside an anti-Western conception of Asian civilisation, Duara’s, ‘East Asian modern.’ \(^{165}\) This conception, to Duara illuminating the fundamentally constructed nature of East Asian nation states, \(^{166}\) veered close to the PRC’s discursive creation of Tibetan support. Duara’s thesis can be extended; such similarity indicates the fundamentally constructed nature of both polities’ claims to be anti-imperial actors.

As with the PRC’s *China Reconstructs*, Manchukuo advertised itself through an international magazine, *Contemporary Manchuria*. The first issue’s preface specifically linked nation-state legitimacy to economic success, ‘dying industries have been rejuvenated and new industries

\(^{159}\) *Tibet 1950-67*, no. 16, p. 62.

\(^{160}\) Ibid, p. 62.

\(^{161}\) Ibid, p. 64.

\(^{162}\) *Kemp, New Woman*, p. 165.

\(^{163}\) Ibid, p. 64.

\(^{164}\) *Duara, Sovereignty*, p. 68.

\(^{165}\) Ibid, p. 3, pp. 16-20.

\(^{166}\) Ibid, pp. 248-251.
fostered…construction activities have shown a greatest boom of modern times.’ 167 Manchukuo’s development justified its existence. In a specific appeal to English-speaking audiences (the magazine was English-language only), the first ever article explained the South Manchuria Railway (SMR), Japan’s long-time agent in the region, as, ‘an influential institution like the East India Company.’ 168 The state compared itself to an earlier imperial organisation to canvass international and especially Anglo-American support. This can be directly compared to China Reconstructs, which was edited by Polish-born Israel Epstein. Epstein was invited by Soong Qingling to edit in 1951, 169 occasionally penning articles, including, ‘Two Girls from Shigatse,’ 170 referenced earlier (p. 21). In January 1956 his, ‘To Lhasa by Road,’ specifically tailored itself to foreign audiences. While in 1937 Contemporary Manchuria showcased SMR’s ‘civilising’ potential through comparison with Britain’s East India Company, road development in Tibet was compared to the new superpower’s history, ‘the building of the Transcontinental Railroad across the United States in the 1860s.’ Tibetans were even said to, ‘look and live like Navajo Indians.’ PRC development ended better for the indigenes than USA’s did however, ‘instead of impoverishment and displacement, they brought these people self-development and a better life.’ 171 This, ‘entirely idyllic,’ 172 positivity (to quote FO), a common trope in strategic highway image laundering, in this article linked such promotion to an American cultural context comprehensible to US readers. Manchukuo and the PRC positioned their activity as civilising order not imperial exploitation, drawing on foreign history to demonstrate their similarity with the historical contexts of target audiences.

Both regimes furthermore parroted tales of minority backwardness and vulnerability solved by the state’s protection. In China Reconstructs, ‘Scientists in Tibet,’ noted, ‘Tibet’s culture has long been stagnant, destitution was everywhere,’ due to, ‘reactionary overlords, both Manchu and Han…invasion and intrigues from abroad.’ 173 Contemporary Manchuria meanwhile claimed Manchukuo had saved the Manchu. After 1911, ‘Han warlords emerged and subjected the Manchus to such pitiful treatment that, for a time, it seemed as though the entire race would be wiped out.’ 174 Contrast that to after Manchukuo’s establishment, ‘the Manchu race, once

167 ‘Why a New Magazine’, Contemporary Manchuria, April 1937, p. i.
170 ‘Two Girls from Shigatse’, China Reconstructs, April 1956, p. 27.
171 ‘To Lhasa by Road’, China Reconstructs, January 1956, pp. 8f.
172 Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, New Delhi, 3 February 1956, TNA, DO 35/8980, 1953-1959, unpaginated.
173 China Reconstructs, November-December 1954, p. 28.
more set out to re-create their lost paradise, this time in complete harmony with four other races, the Japanese, Chosenese, Chinese (Hans), and Mongols.\footnote{Idem, p. 59.} PRC rhetoric on the Han nationality aiding the less-developed was in *Contemporary Manchuria* reflected in a slightly different arrangement of power relations; just as ethnic unity in the PRC’s empire needed to be proclaimed, so too were ethnic groups occupying Manchuria linked in the Concordia of Nationalities to the Japanese and Koreans in the rest of the Japanese Empire. The Japanese meanwhile replaced the Han as the premier group within the Concordia of Nationalities. Developmental imperialism and notions of rejuvenation-as-socialism had a cousin in the anti-communist East Asian Modern, ‘civilising mission.’\footnote{Kumar, *Visions*, p. 6.} Despite both regimes’ historical hostility their medias ploughed a shared soil; developmental imperialist attitudes regarding primitivism, modernisation justifying control, and imperialism instituting modernity.

Similarity did not preclude difference. Obviously, Manchukuo was not communist; while the PRC’s conception of developmental imperialism included (eventual) social levelling, Manchukuo’s corporate enforcement of traditional communities in its Concordia of Nationalities aimed to prevent that. Indeed, Duara noted progressive Mongol youth protested at their community organisation via lamaseries, this shutting off access to secular education.\footnote{Duara, *Sovereignty*, p. 75.} Meanwhile, although in 1931 the CCP’s Resolution of the First All-China Congress of Soviets on the Question of National Minorities recognised self-determination and considered a future, ‘Union of Chinese Soviets,’\footnote{Legal Materials on Tibet, Third Edition, https://sites.google.com/site/legalmaterialsontibet/home/communist-constitution-1931.} it later rejected full Soviet ethnoterritorial federalism and as the 1954 constitution noted, proclaimed a, ‘unitary multinational state.’\footnote{Liu Shaoqi, *Report*, pp. 65f.} Indeed, on 28 January 1958 state press ran an article specifically noting, ‘demands for a union of republics,’ constituted local nationalism, ‘of a very grave character.’\footnote{SCMP, no. 1718, pp. 23f.} The USSR’s unveiling campaign meanwhile specifically undercut the clerical elites of Central Asia whose Tibetan peers were from 1951-9 (and after for many- the Panchen until 1964\footnote{Shakya, *Dragon*, pp. 290-302.}) co-opted into PRC state apparatus. Similarity in the developmental imperialisms of USSR, PRC and Manchukuo by no means obscures historical divergences, yet the fact such deep similarities existed despite differences illuminates the extent to which all three regimes were demonstrably developmental imperialist. Indeed, the connection was not entirely unnoticed by contemporaries. After all, at the Afro-
Asian Convention (New Delhi, 1960) China would be denounced for practicing a, ‘new style of colonialism,’ comparable to the Soviet Muslim republics.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{182}Kham, \textit{Muslim}, p. 51.
Conclusion

Precisely two months after the seizure of Jokhang Temple terminated the 1959 Uprising in Lhasa, a remarkable article graced Xinhua English. ‘How Central People’s Government and the People’s Liberation Army Have Helped Tibetans,’ proclaimed a long list of successes, ‘to the great appreciation of the Tibetan people,’ due to the presence of PRC in Tibet. The Lhasa People’s Hospital alone from 1952-8 had now treated over 1 million people, Tibet, ‘long known for its utter lack of means of communications,’ now hosted several thousand kilometres of highway, while, ‘Last year, improvised types of blast furnaces were built in Lhasa and pig iron was made from local ore.’ The Tibetan, carefully trained up by Party and state, even occasionally held responsible modern office, ‘Tibetans are now doing various kinds of work in government organizations, enterprises and educational and medical establishments in all parts of the Tibet region. Not a few of them have taken on responsible posts.’\textsuperscript{183} But what have the Romans ever done for us?\textsuperscript{184}

The PRC’s hearts and minds endeavour in Tibet, though ultimately unsuccessful, was still two months after the Lhasa Uprising being justified through the rhetoric of developmental imperialism. Indeed, developmentalism would prove to have a long history in PRC borderlands, perhaps most recently in the Great Western Development Strategy presaging the Belt and Road Initiative. Attempting to resolve the perennial issue of borderlands security in Chinese strategic calculation,\textsuperscript{185} and indeed to materialise the territorialisation of a 20th century nation state,\textsuperscript{186} the PRC claimed the former Qing empire in toto\textsuperscript{187} and then sought to justify its presence in the borderlands through sustained educational, institutional and economic development with a strategic eye. The Tibetan periphery’s socialist transformation took on a strongly imperial vector, the CCP’s own, ‘civilising mission,’\textsuperscript{188} as notions of ‘correct’ worker and youth behaviour and political mobilisation were carefully introduced to the population. Concerned about the cost of a security state meanwhile, strategic highway development and the PLA’s role were both cloaked in a beneficent garb. The flipside of this was a deliberate presentation of Tibet and its inhabitants as primitives, incapable of rationally utilising their own national

\textsuperscript{183}‘How Central People’s Government and the People’s Liberation Army Have Helped Tibetans’, NCNA-English, Lhasa, 23 May 1959 SCMP, no. 2020, pp. 23f.
\textsuperscript{184}Terry Jones, \textit{Monty Python’s Life of Brian} (1979).
\textsuperscript{186}Xiaoyuan Liu, \textit{Recast All Under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th Century} (New York, 2010), pp. 3-14.
\textsuperscript{187}Barring Outer Mongolia.
\textsuperscript{188}Kumar, \textit{Visions}, p. 6.
resources, their miserable hygiene and education before Liberation to be pitied, their clamour for reunification with their eternal motherland to be succoured by a beneficent central government.

The tools and imperial clusters of this policy were hardly static nor imposed without internal debate. Fan Ming and Han Chauvinism merely constitutes one example, yet the vignette indicates that notions of developmental imperialism came to form a durable structure through which such policy debates could be articulated and colonise wider currents. The baseline idea of development demarcated the boundaries of such debate and was not itself challenged, merely the speed and extent of interior-China-style democratic reforms involved in such development.

The intersection of socialism with imperialism therefore proved to be vital to the entrenchment of state control. Analysing this process in the neighbouring Amdo’s Zeku County, Weiner concluded that the PRC, attempting to translate empire to nation, came unstuck in this regard when desires for rapid socialist transformation prevented de-imperialization by moving so fast indigenous elites instead registered a hostile, foreign imposition of imperial rule.189 This study contends however that the link between socialism and empire in the early PRC was closer and can be carefully parsed, primarily through the state’s own press which after all was fundamentally a mouthpiece explaining and justifying state action to citizens and the wider world.

The pedagogy of PRC socialist transformation and the sense of civilising mission imbued within it resulted in a modernisation policy conducted by a majority-Han state upon a border province without meaningful choice. This directly enabled and constituted imperialism in itself, amounting to imposing a filtered Marxist-Leninist conception of modernity upon a society where such concepts and notions were broadly alien. Reinforced imperial domination was not an accident of transition from empire to nation via socialism, socialism and imperialism could constitute two sides of the same coin. In stretching a unitary nation-state over an empire’s bones, the PRC did not de-imperialise, it de-nationalised into an imperial formation comparable not only to the USSR, which in many ways underwent a similar process, but also to formations widely contemporarily acknowledged to be imperial regimes, in this case Manchukuo. This imperialism centred the developmental state as proving the regime’s anti-imperial difference, instituting significant economic change and a small C cultural revolution which although sometimes beneficial to peripheral inhabitants had metropolitan goals and aims in mind. Indeed,

as the political history of Tibet 1951-9, or the treatment of the supposed role model young cadre in Chapter 2 indicated (p. 24), it proved to be so alienating to many Tibetans that it spurred several armed and a final mass popular uprising against ‘Chinese’ rule. As Friere put it, ‘Revolutionary leaders commit many errors and miscalculations by not taking into account something so real as the people’s view of the world.’¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰Friere, Pedagogy, p. 155.
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